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Introduction and summary
Many people would argue that U.S. elementary and 
secondary public schools need to improve, and they 
would like to see U.S. students perform better in in-
ternational comparisons. In addition, many people 
would like to do more to close the achievement gaps 
within the U.S. between lower-income and minority 
students and their counterparts. These concerns are 
shared by parents, employers, policymakers, and  
society more generally. There is less agreement on 
the root causes of the problems and how best to tackle 
them. For example, while some would argue that  
insufficient funding is the primary factor, others 
would say that this is not supported by the evidence, 
since per pupil spending has increased faster than 
achievement, as reflected in scores on the National 
Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP).1
One strategy for improving school performance 
that has received a lot of attention by all those inter-
ested in education policy is increased competition. The 
idea is that just as competition can enhance efficiency 
and value in the marketplace for goods more generally, 
it can do the same for education. Namely, if schools 
must compete for students, then they will take steps 
to ensure that the educational experiences they offer 
are valued by parents and students. The primary mech-
anism proposed by those who favor more competition 
in elementary and secondary education in the public 
sector is an education voucher—a coupon redeemable 
for a maximum dollar amount per child if spent to at-
tend a private school. In this way, voucher programs 
remove the monopoly power of local public schools. 
Instead of having to attend a neighborhood public 
school, students can use the voucher to attend a pri-
vate school.
In the 2007–08 school year, roughly 55,000 stu-
dents in three states—Florida, Ohio, and Wisconsin—
and the District of Columbia were using publicly 
funded education vouchers to attend private schools 
(as well as other higher-performing public schools);2 
see table 1. Several other states have considered 
voucher programs, and some private organizations 
have helped create privately funded voucher opportu-
nities. But are voucher programs effective? Do they 
improve the educational outcomes of the students 
who use them and do they improve the quality of the 
public schools? In this article, we review the existing 
empirical evidence on the impact of school vouchers 
on student achievement.3 After reviewing the research, 
we conclude that expectations about the ability of 
vouchers to drastically improve student achievement, 
at least as measured by test scores, should be tempered 
by the results of the studies to date. That said, many 
questions remain. For example, no studies have ex-
amined the longer-run impact of vouchers on outcomes 
such as graduation rates, college enrollment, and fu-
ture wages. Similarly, the research designs for identi-
fying the potential impacts on students who remain in 
the public schools are far from ideal. Finally, we have 
little understanding of whether vouchers would repre-
sent a cost-neutral alternative to our current system of 
public education provision at the elementary and sec-
ondary school levels.3 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
In the next section, we discuss the theoretical 
reasons for why education vouchers should improve 
student achievement followed by a discussion of the 
empirical approaches used for identifying the effects 
of vouchers. We then review the best evidence from 
studies of publicly and privately financed school 
voucher programs on the short-run impact on student 
achievement, discuss the evidence on the potential 
impact on students who remain in the public schools, 
consider additional voucher outcomes, and conclude.
Why should competition improve our 
educational system?
The idea of injecting competition into the public 
school system is not new; for example, Milton Friedman 
(1962) argued in the early 1960s for separating the  
financing and provision of public schooling by issuing 
education vouchers. The rationale behind school 
vouchers is that competitive markets allocate resources 
more efficiently than do monopolistic ones and that 
public schools in the U.S. have “monopoly” power 
because children are assigned to attend their local 
neighborhood school. Parents can always choose to 
send their children to a private school, but that means 
paying for schooling twice—once through property 
taxes (for the public schooling they are not using) and 
again through private school tuition. If parents had 
more publicly funded options for their children’s school-
ing—once they had selected a residential location—
then schools would have to compete for students. Further, 
more options may improve the match between the  
educational interests and needs of students and their 
schools. Importantly, schools in this model would 
have an incentive to improve in the areas valued by 
parents. Thus, if parents select schools based on their 
academic quality, then schools will compete for stu-
dents by providing better academics; alternatively,  
if parents value religious education or sports, then 
one would expect to see schools compete to serve 
these interests.
There are two hypothesized ways by which in-
creased school choice would improve student educa-
tional outcomes. The first is a “direct” effect for those 
students who actually exercise choice. Assuming that 
students would only choose to attend a school other 
than their neighborhood school if that school were aca-
demically better (or a better match), then the academic 
achievement of students who opt for a different school 
should improve relative to what their performance 
would have been had they stayed in the neighborhood 
public school. In addition, there is an “indirect,” or 
“general equilibrium,” effect on students remaining 
in the public schools. Competition should induce the 
public schools to improve in an effort to attract (or re-
tain) students. Thus, not only should the achievement 
of those who choose to attend private schools in-
crease, but so should the achievement of those who 
do not choose as well. In other words, competition 
should increase the efficiency of public schools. Of 
course, expansion of the private sector is a critical 
component of increasing competition. Without new 
school entries and/or increases in the size of current 
private schools, vouchers would have limited ability 
to increase choice.
Many empirical studies find that students in  
private schools have higher educational achievement 
levels than those in public schools.4 The findings 
from such studies are presented by voucher advocates 
as prima facie evidence that vouchers would improve 
student achievement for all. Namely, voucher advo-
cates argue that private schools outperform public 
schools because their existence depends on providing 
a good product. Educational vouchers are intended to 
make public schools compete in this same way; so, 
only schools (either public or private) providing a good 
product would survive. However, this literature is not 
conclusive because of the difficulty (described later) 
in identifying the impact of schools on student achieve-
ment. Not surprisingly, critics argue that the observed 
superiority of private schools in these studies arises 
because the students who attend private schools differ 
from the students who attend public schools rather 
than because private schools are more effective than 
public schools.5 If the observed relative superiority of 
the private sector is due more to the particular back-
ground characteristics of its students than the greater 
effectiveness of its schools, the achievement of current 
public school students would not necessarily improve 
in private schools. 
While the debate continues on whether private 
schools, in general, are better at educating children 
than are public schools, researchers have since turned 
to more direct evidence on the impact of vouchers by 
studying actual school voucher programs. We begin 
with an overview of the challenges of testing whether 
vouchers improve student outcomes before reviewing 
the evidence to date.
Empirical approaches to studying  
school vouchers
To study whether educational outcomes in the 
presence of vouchers are better than educational out-
comes in the absence of vouchers, ideally, one would 
begin with a group of students and educate them for  
a period of time under the current public school system. 
At the end of the period, one would assess various  3Q/008, Economic Perspectives
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Voucher	program	 program	 2007–08	 Other	information
EdChoice Scholarship  2006  6,580  Students are eligible to apply if they currently attend or will be 
Program (Ohio)      entering an EdChoice-designated public school in the upcoming
      year or if they currently attend a charter school but would other-
      wise be assigned by the school district to an EdChoice-desig-
      nated school. 
      There is currently a maximum of 14,000 scholarships that can 
      be awarded across the state, and there are no income require-
      ments to receive a scholarship. If more than 14,000 students 
      apply, then students who are renewing their scholarships followed
      by students who are at or below 200 percent of the poverty level
      receive priority.
      The program pays the minimum of a school’s tuition or $4,375 
      per student from kindergarten through eighth grade and $5,150 
      per student from ninth through 12th grades.
Cleveland Scholarship and  1996–97  6,017  Any student living within the boundaries of the Cleveland
Tutoring Program (Ohio)      Metropolitan School District (CMSD) and entering kindergarten 
      through eighth grade is eligible to apply. Low-income students are 
      given priority, and scholarships are awarded by lottery drawings. 
      A student is not eligible to apply once he or she has entered high 
      school, although scholarships have been made available to pro-
      gram participants once they reach high school. 
      All children currently attending Cleveland Metropolitan Schools  
      in kindergarten through 12th grade are eligible for the tutoring 
      program. 
      The scholarship program pays either 75 percent or 90 percent 
      of a school’s tuition (depending on family income) not exceeding 
      $3,450 for the 2007–08 school year.
A+ Opportunity Scholarship  2000  1,305    Students are eligible for the A+ Opportunity Scholarship Program
Program (Florida)    in public  through the highest grade of their public school if their school is 
    schools   currently “failing” (graded an F) for its second year in a four-year
    (see next column)  period. The scholarships could continue into high school if the
      high school was assigned a grade below C. 
      The program made an average scholarship payment of $4,206 
      per student in 2005–06.
      These scholarships (vouchers) for private schools were declared
      unconstitutional by the Florida Supreme Court in January 2006.
      Thereafter students could no longer use these vouchers to 
      attend participating private schools; they are, however, still able 
      to use the vouchers to attend higher-graded public schools.
outcomes for the students and administer a test, the 
results of which would perfectly reflect what the stu-
dents know. Then one would turn back time so that 
the same group of students was reverted to their con-
ditions at the beginning of the experiment. That is, the 
students would be the same age, have the same living 
conditions, and so on. This time, one would educate 
the students in a system with education vouchers. At 
the end of the same period of time, one would again 
assess the students’ outcomes and what they know. 
The difference between the students’ outcomes under 
the current and voucher systems would isolate the im-
pact of vouchers because vouchers would be the only 
difference at the beginning of each experimental peri-
od.6 If implemented on a small scale, this experiment 
would allow one to estimate the direct effect of 
vouchers; if implemented on a large scale, this would 
uncover the potential effects on all students, including 
those who remain in the public schools.
Obviously, such an evaluation is not possible. 
So, to study the direct effect of vouchers, researchers 
must rely on comparing the achievement (or other 
outcomes) of students who were offered a voucher 
(or actually used a voucher to attend a different school) 
with the outcomes of students who were denied a 
voucher, were ineligible for a voucher, or remained in 
the public schools for other reasons.7 The empirical 
challenge is that the outcomes of the nonvoucher stu-
dents may not provide a valid approximation of what  Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
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Description of publicly funded voucher programs in 2007–08
     
McKay Scholarships for  1999–2000  19,439  To be eligible for this program, students must have been part of 
Students with Disabilities      the Florida public school system for at least one year, have been
Program (Florida)      counted in the prior school year’s October and February enroll-
      ment surveys, and have an individual education plan. 
      For the 19,439 students currently enrolled, there has been a total 
      payment amount of $99,212,622.04 so far for the 2007–08 school 
      year. There was a total payment amount of $119,092,631.54 
      across the state for the 2006–07 school year, assisting 18,273 
      students. Scholarship amounts are awarded on an individual basis.
Milwaukee Parental Choice  1990  18,882  Milwaukee Parental Choice Program students have family incomes 
Program (Wisconsin)      at or below 175 percent of the federal poverty level ($35,843 for 
      a family of four in 2007–08). Once a student is in the program, 
      family income may rise to 220 percent of the federal poverty level 
      ($45,057 for a family of four in 2007–08). The voucher was worth 
      a maximum of $6,501 in 2007–08.
DC Opportunity Scholarship  2004  1,903  Eligibility requirements give preference to students in kindergarten
Program (District of Columbia)      through 12th grade who are eligible for free or reduced lunch  
      and who are enrolled in public schools that fail to make sufficient 
      yearly progress as defined by the No Child Left Behind Act. 
      The program offers scholarships for up to $7,500 to cover the 
      costs of tuition, fees, and transportation for students to attend 
      participating DC private schools. Scholarships are renewable for 
      up to five years as long as students remain eligible and in good
      academic standing at their private schools.
Sources: Ohio Department of Education, http://EdChoice.ohio.gov and www.ode.state.oh.us/gd/gd.aspx?page=2&TopicRelationID=672; Florida 
Department of Education, www.floridaschoolchoice.org; Wisconsin Legislative Fiscal Bureau, www.legis.state.wi.us/lfb/Informationalpapers/29.pdf; 




Voucher	program	 program	 2007–08	 Other	information
would have happened to the voucher students had they 
not been offered or used a voucher. The voucher stu-
dents may not have done as well (or as poorly!) as the 
nonvoucher students in the absence of the voucher 
program because their individual characteristics differ 
substantially. For example, the students with parents 
who are very educationally focused and motivated may 
be more likely to apply for a school voucher, and yet 
these students may have done better than their non-
voucher classmates even in the absence of the voucher 
program because of their higher level of parental sup-
port and encouragement. Unless the research design 
can take these individual characteristics fully into ac-
count, the estimated impact of vouchers will not likely 
generate the true impact of vouchers on student achieve-
ment (in statistical terms the estimated impact will be 
“biased”). As a result, researchers have relied on ana-
lytical strategies that attempt to control for all differ-
ences between the two groups of students, observed 
and unobserved. 
The first strategy is to control for students’ achieve-
ment (typically a test score) prior to using the school 
voucher in order to adjust for nonschool factors (such 
as having educationally focused parents or low family 
income) that affect this achievement and that might also 
be correlated with a student’s likelihood of applying 
for a voucher. This strategy amounts to comparing the 
change in achievement of students before and after par-
ticipation in the voucher program with the change in 
achievement of students who did not participate in the 
program. The assumption that must hold for this esti-
mate to generate the true (unbiased) effect of vouchers 
is that there are no other differences that would explain 
changes in the test scores between the two groups of 
students except for the use of a voucher. Although this 
approach has some appeal, one might reasonably be 
concerned that students who were not doing well (or 
were doing very well) in the public schools were 
more interested in a different schooling experience 
and that prior test scores do not perfectly reflect aca-
demic “ability,” achievement, or motivation.
A second, more compelling strategy to generate 
estimates of the effect of vouchers on student outcomes is 
to use a random assignment design. In this “experimen-
tal” research design, students are randomly assigned 
to either a “treatment group” that is offered a school  3Q/008, Economic Perspectives
voucher or a “control group” that is not. In this case, 
there are no differences in the observed or unobserved 
individual characteristics, on average, between the 
two groups because the offer of a voucher was deter-
mined not by one’s family’s income or motivation, 
but purely by the flip of a coin. As a result, one need 
not control for other student characteristics. Properly 
implemented, such a strategy is viewed as the “gold 
standard” for estimating a causal relationship between 
vouchers and student outcomes. In practice, however, 
nonrandom differences can emerge between the treat-
ment and control groups to the extent that the research-
ers conducting the study are not able to adequately 
follow up with both groups of students. 
A simple comparison of the outcomes of students 
in the treatment group (those offered vouchers) and 
those in the control group (those not offered vouchers) 
will generate a true (unbiased) estimate of the impact 
of being offered a voucher on student outcomes—a 
parameter known as the “intention to treat” in the re-
search literature. This impact reflects two factors that 
are important for proper evaluation of a voucher pro-
gram: the rate at which students who are offered a 
voucher actually use one and the relative achievement 
of students in private schools. As such, the intention 
to treat has two appealing properties: It is the only 
unambiguously true (unbiased) estimate that one can 
obtain using typical statistical methods, such as ordi-
nary least squares regression, and it reflects the over-
all potential gains from offering the vouchers as a 
policy (since those who are offered vouchers cannot 
be compelled to use them). 
Many are also interested in whether students who 
actually use vouchers experience academic gains as a 
result—an effect known as the “treatment on the treated” 
among researchers. Because actual use of a voucher 
is not randomly determined, analysts must resort to 
nonexperimental methods to generate consistent esti-
mates of the treatment-on-the-treated gains by those 
who actually use vouchers to attend private school. A 
common approach is to use an instrumental variables 
strategy: Whether a student was randomly offered a 
voucher is used as an instrumental variable for the 
student attending a private school. This type of analy-
sis would generate a consistent estimate of whether 
the schools that the voucher students attended were 
more, less, or equally as effective as the schools that 
the nonvoucher students attended.
Evidence on the direct impact of school 
vouchers on students
In the U.S., two types of school voucher programs 
have been studied—those financed by the government 
(publicly funded school vouchers) and those provided 
by the private sector (privately funded school vouch-
ers). From a public policy perspective, the evidence 
from publicly funded programs is most relevant as 
these programs incorporate some of the design features 
that might be built into a larger school voucher pro-
gram, such as limitations on which students are eligible 
to receive a voucher and the provision or reimburse-
ment of transportation (if any at all). That said, some 
of the most compelling evidence (from a methodologi-
cal perspective) comes from the privately funded 
vouchers, so we review that evidence here as well. We 
begin with evidence from publicly funded programs.
We translate the estimated impacts for all of the 
programs into “standardized effect sizes” (σ) in order 
to compare estimates across studies. In particular, the 
estimated difference in test scores between voucher 
and comparison (nonvoucher) students has been di-
vided by the standard deviation of the test score from 
a national sample of students. The reason for dividing 
by the standard deviation is to account for the fact that 
studies have used different tests to assess the students. 
The problem is that an assessment of whether a gain 
is “big” or “small” depends on the shape of the under-
lying distribution of the test. Thus, for example, a five-
point gain using a test that has a narrow bell shape  
(a small standard deviation) implies a larger gain in 
student learning than does an eight-point gain using  
a test that has a wide bell shape (a large standard de-
viation). Thus, researchers “standardize” the test score 
gain by the spread of the distribution to account for 
its underlying shape and often report “effect sizes”  
in standard deviation units. 
Once standardized, however, one must still judge 
whether an estimated effect size is large or small. Re-
cently, Hill et al. (2007) attempted to review effect sizes 
from many studies of educational interventions. While 
they caution that it is only valid to compare effect sizes 
when using comparable populations, contexts, and in-
terventions, as well as the outcomes being measured, 
they report that effect size estimates from randomized 
studies average 0.33σ for elementary schools, the typi-
cal grade level for the studies of voucher programs 
we review here.
Table 1 (pp. 4–5) briefly describes publicly fund-
ed voucher programs in the U.S. Since the launch of 
the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program in Wisconsin 
in the early 1990s, several other publicly financed 
voucher programs have been started, including one in 
Washington, DC, in which the vouchers are allocated 
on a randomized basis. Not only is the Milwaukee 
Parental Choice Program one of the oldest publicly 
funded voucher programs in the U.S., it has also been 
subject to numerous studies. The program is open to  Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
low-income students who may use a voucher to attend 
any participating school (including religious schools) 
worth approximately $6,501 in the 2007–08 academ-
ic year. Nearly 19,000 students and 120 schools par-
ticipated that academic year. 
Most of the studies regarding potential achieve-
ment impacts of the Milwaukee program were con-
ducted when the program had only been in operation 
for about four years and vouchers could only be used 
at nonreligious schools. At that time, about 12 schools 
and 800 students participated. Because the schools 
participating in the program were required to take all 
students who applied and to randomly select among 
applicants in the event of oversubscription, researchers 
had two potential comparison groups available—un-
successful applicants and a random sample of low- 
income students from the Milwaukee Public Schools. 
Using both comparison groups, Rouse (1998) reports 
mixed results of the “direct” effect of the program: 
She estimates intent-to-treat effect sizes ranging from 
0.06σ to 0.11σ in math and from –0.03σ to 0.03σ in 
reading, although the impacts in reading are never 
statistically different from zero, meaning that the dif-
ference may have arisen by chance.8
 Evidence from the Cleveland Scholarship and 
Tutoring Program (CSTP) suggests even smaller im-
pacts on student outcomes. The voucher program is 
open to all students living within the boundaries of 
the Cleveland Metropolitan School District, with pref-
erence given to students in low-income families.9  
Students are permitted to use the vouchers at both 
nonreligious and religious schools. (The tutoring pro-
gram provides tutors to interested students from kin-
dergarten through 12th grade.) The CSTP data allow 
researchers to identify three groups of applicants: 
voucher recipients who use the voucher, voucher re-
cipients who do not use the voucher, and nonrecipi-
ents.10 Additionally, Cleveland Metropolitan School 
District and test score data are available for a (non-
random) sample of public school students.11
Analyzing data from the cohort of students who 
entered kindergarten in 1997, Belfield (2007) compares 
voucher winners and rejected applicants with the avail-
able sample of Cleveland public school students. He 
also estimates the effect of attending private school 
by comparing voucher users with the rejected appli-
cants. In the third year of the program (when the co-
hort is in second grade), he finds that voucher winners 
scored significantly lower in math (–0.08σ) and lower 
in reading (–0.05σ) than those in the public school sam-
ple. Further, he finds that voucher users scored signif-
icantly lower in both math and reading (–0.11σ and 
–0.13σ, respectively) than the rejected applicants.12  
In the fifth year of the program (when the cohort was 
in fourth grade), the results are more mixed with esti-
mated effects ranging from –0.08σ in math to 0.07σ 
in reading for the effect of using a voucher, but neither 
estimate is statistically different from zero.13 
While the studies of both Milwaukee and Cleveland 
attempt to construct valid comparison groups and 
thereby identify causal impacts of the voucher programs 
on student outcomes, all of them rely on observation-
al data and therefore may not fully account for pre-
existing differences between the voucher and comparison 
groups. This leads to biased estimates of the impact 
of vouchers. In the case of Milwaukee, the bias could 
be either positive (in that the students who participat-
ed in the voucher program were more motivated) or 
negative (in that the random sample of low-income 
students in the public schools was too advantaged rel-
ative to the voucher participants). While Rouse (1998) 
attempts to determine the extent of any such bias (and 
concludes it is likely minimal), it remains an untest-
able assumption. Belfield (2007) is subject to the 
same general research design concern.14
This methodological concern could, in theory,  
be addressed in the study of the relatively new  
DC Opportunity Scholarship Program (DC OSP)  
in Washington, DC, which is being evaluated using  
a random assignment program design.15 In the first  
two years of the program (2004 and 2005), 2,038  
eligible public school students participated in the  
lotteries; 1,387 of them were awarded scholarships,  
and the remaining 921 students became the “control 
group.” Wolf et al. (2007) estimate that after one 
year, intent-to-treat effect sizes for the first two cohorts 
of students ranged from –0.01σ to 0.08σ in math and 
from –0.01σ to 0.03σ in reading. After two years, 
Wolf et al. (2008) report that the impacts ranged from 
–0.02σ to 0.01σ in math and from 0.05σ to 0.08σ in 
reading. Not only do these ranges include negative 
impacts but none of them are statistically different 
from zero at the 5 percent level.  
Thus far, the evidence from the publicly funded 
voucher programs suggests, at best, mixed improve-
ment among either students who were selected for a 
voucher (the intent to treat) or students who used a 
voucher (the treatment on the treated). The largest es-
timates, from the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program, 
suggest potential (intent-to-treat) gains of 0.11σ in 
math and gains of 0.14σ for those who actually use a 
voucher to attend a private school; most of the other 
estimates are much smaller or even negative. Howev-
er, with the exception of the studies on the DC OSP, 
the studies suffer from potentially unsatisfactory 
comparison groups. As such, we now turn to evidence 
from the privately funded programs.8 3Q/008, Economic Perspectives
Although a fairly recent U.S. General Accounting 
Office (2002) report found 78 privately funded voucher 
programs to review, only a handful have been subject 
to any evaluation.16 Three privately funded voucher 
programs—based in New York City; Dayton, Ohio; 
and Washington, DC—had randomized study designs, 
making them the best suited for rigorous evaluation. 
As in the publicly funded DC OSP, the privately funded 
programs in each city had greater numbers of appli-
cants than vouchers available; therefore, applicants 
were randomly selected to receive or not to receive a 
voucher offer. For the New York City program (School 
Choice Scholarships Foundation), for example, the 
number of applicants was so large that the “control 
group” is made up of a random sample of applicants 
not selected to receive a voucher. We briefly describe 
each of the privately funded voucher programs with a 
randomized study design in table 2. 
Across all three cities, Howell, Peterson, et al. 
(2002) find that using a voucher has no overall im-
pact on student test scores. Indeed, after three years 
the estimated impact of attending a private school is 
only 0.02σ. Similarly, both Mayer et al. (2002) and 
Krueger and Zhu (2004) report very small impacts  
(at most a 0.06σ impact for using a voucher) in any 
year for the program in New York City, and none of 
the estimates are statistically distinguishable from zero. 
Nevertheless, a widely publicized result from 
these privately funded programs is that there may have 
been differences across subgroups of students. Indeed, 
Howell, Peterson, et al. (2002) and Mayer et al. (2002) 
report statistically significant positive effects of private 
school attendance on test scores for African American 
students alone. Also, after three years, those African 
American students who used a voucher are estimated 
to have experienced a 0.23σ gain in achievement 
across the three cities; those African American students 
who used a voucher from the New York City program 
are estimated to have gained 0.26σ.17
However, these results are not robust. In their re-
analysis of the data from the New York City program, 
Krueger and Zhu (2004) report that the results by race 
are particularly sensitive to two analytical decisions. 
First, Krueger and Zhu include all students, whereas 
Mayer et al. (2002) include baseline test scores in all 
of their specifications, which leads them to exclude 
the students who were missing baseline test score in-
formation; most of the excluded are first grade students 
who were not administered a baseline test. Because 
students were randomly chosen to receive or not to 
receive a voucher, baseline characteristics such as test 
scores should have been identical for the two groups 
(on average). The primary reason for including baseline 
characteristics would be to improve the precision of 
the estimates. However, Krueger and Zhu find very little 
difference in the precision of the estimated impact of 
vouchers when using the larger sample without base-
line test scores. As a result, they argue that the gain in 
terms of statistical precision is not great enough to war-
rant the cost in terms of not generating estimates that 
are representative of the original target population.
The second substantive difference between the 
studies is how the researchers define a student’s race. 
Mayer et al. (2002) identifies a student as African 
American if the mother’s race is reported as African 
American and non-Hispanic (irrespective of the race 
or ethnicity of the father). Krueger and Zhu (2004) use 
alternative identifications. They identify a student as 
African American if either parent is African American 
and non-Hispanic; also, in their definition of African 
American, they include the group of students whose 
parents responded “other” to the survey but indicated 
that they (the parents) were “black” in the open-ended 
response. With the larger sample and the broadest 
identification of students as African American, Krueger 
and Zhu report that the estimated impact of being  
offered a voucher (intent-to-treat impact) for African 
American students falls to 0.05σ after three years and 
the estimated impact of using a voucher (treatment on 
the treated) falls to 0.03σ; neither estimate is statisti-
cally different from zero. 
In sum, there is little evidence of overall improve-
ment in test score outcomes for students offered an 
education voucher from privately funded voucher 
programs. Although there may be evidence that some 
subgroups of students benefit from being offered a 
voucher, the evidence is not robust to sensible alter-
native ways of constructing the analysis sample. In 
addition, the results of these experiments may not be 
valid for thinking about the average benefits of offer-
ing vouchers to all students. Namely, all participants 
in the experiment—both voucher recipients and non-
recipients—had expressed an interest in vouchers.
Evidence of public school response  
to competitive pressure
As we have emphasized, the studies discussed 
previously are based on relatively small voucher pro-
grams such that there was likely little competitive pres-
sure to which the public sector would have responded. 
As such, the estimates are primarily of the direct ef-
fect of vouchers for those who use them. However, 
the true prize of a voucher system—or any significant 
increase in the competitive pressure experienced by 
the public schools—is overall improvement in the  Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
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Voucher	program	 period	 evaluation	 Other	information
School Choice Scholarships  1997–99  1,200  Students were eligible to apply if they were entering first through 
Foundation (New York City, NY)      fifth grades, currently attending a public school, and qualified for 
      the National School Lunch Program.   
      The program began in 1997, paid up to $1,400 annually, and 
      initially guaranteed three years of receipt. The scholarships were 
      later extended beyond the initial three years.
Parents Advancing Choice  1998–99  530  Students in kindergarten through 12th grade whose family income 
in Education, or PACE      was less than 200 percent of the federal poverty line were eligible.
(Dayton, OH)      (Students currently enrolled in private school were eligible for the 
      program but not included in the evaluation. The evaluation focuses 
      on students in the first through seventh grades at baseline.)
      At most, the scholarship was worth $1,200 or 60 percent of 
      tuition, whichever was less. However, voucher awards were smaller
      for higher-income families. The program began in 1998, and while 
      the evaluation followed students for only two years, PACE continued
      to award new scholarships through 2008. In 2008 the average 
      scholarship is worth $1,800, and students are guaranteed a 
      scholarship for at least four years.
Washington Scholarship Fund  1998–2001  1,000  Students entering kindergarten through eighth grade whose family 
(Washington, DC)      income was less than 270 percent of the federal poverty line were 
      eligible. (Students currently enrolled in private school were eligible 
      for the program but not included in the evaluation. The evaluation 
      focuses on students in the first through seventh grades at baseline.)
      At most, the scholarship was worth $1,700 or 60 percent of tui-
      tion, whichever was less. However, voucher awards were smaller
      for higher-income families. The voucher program began in 1993 
      and continued to offer scholarships in 2008. In 2008–09, the 
      scholarships are worth up to $3,000 per child each year.
Sources: Howell, Wolf, et al. (2002); Parents Advancing Choice in Education, www.pacedayton.org; and Washington Scholarship Fund,  
www.washingtonscholarshipfund.org.
performance of the affected education system. Unfor-
tunately, to develop a study that would generate unbi-
ased estimates of any such systemic impacts is extremely 
difficult. One cannot simply compare the outcomes of 
students who use a voucher (or who were offered a 
voucher) to the outcomes of students who remained 
in the public schools (either by choice or from “bad 
luck” in a lottery) as this would likely underestimate 
the general equilibrium impact. The problem is that, 
in theory, the public schools should improve in response 
to the increased competition and this improvement 
should be reflected in the achievement of the public 
school students. As a result, the control (or compari-
son) students would not adequately represent what 
would have happened to the voucher students in the 
absence of the voucher program. 
Rather, one would ideally gather a large group of 
education “markets” (assuming that any general equi-
librium impacts remain within a market and there are 
no spillovers to others) and randomly assign some 
markets to a treatment group—in which the students 
would be eligible for school vouchers—and randomly 
assign the remaining markets to a control group—in 
which there would be no vouchers. After some period 
of time, the researcher would then compare the aver-
age outcomes of students in the voucher markets with 
those of students in the control markets. A simple 
comparison of the outcomes would yield an unbiased 
estimate of the general equilibrium impact of vouch-
ers because, on average, the markets would have been 
similar ex ante. While such an experiment is possible 
in theory, in practice it would be extremely difficult to 
implement mostly because it would require the coordi-
nation and cooperation of so many different stake-
holders. As a result, researchers have turned to other 
research designs to try to get an estimate of the poten-
tial impact of a large-scale voucher program.10 3Q/008, Economic Perspectives
Evidence from the expansion of the Milwaukee 
Parental Choice Program
After the experimental phase of the Milwaukee 
Parental Choice Program ended in 1995, the program 
was expanded to allow for a maximum of 15 percent 
of the public school enrollment; further, in 1998 the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled that the vouchers 
could be used in religious schools. These two events 
led to a dramatic increase in participation in the pro-
gram by both students and schools. In fact, the pro-
gram was so popular that in 2006, participation was 
expanded to 22,500 voucher students. Researchers 
have attempted to analyze these last two expansions 
to estimate the potential impact of a large-scale voucher 
program on student achievement in the public sector 
(see Hoxby, 2003; Carnoy et al., 2007; and Chakrabarti, 
2008). While some of the details differ, the basic 
strategy of all three studies is to attempt to identify 
those schools within the Milwaukee Public School 
District that face differing competitive pressure be-
cause of the mix of income levels among their stu-
dents. (Those schools with a high proportion of 
low-income students who are eligible for the voucher 
program presumably face more competitive pressure 
than those with a low proportion of low-income stu-
dents who are eligible.) The basic strategy of all three 
studies also identifies observably comparable districts 
elsewhere in Wisconsin in which there are no public-
ly funded vouchers. The following would be evidence 
of a positive impact of competition on school efficien-
cy, as reflected in student test scores: Disproportion-
ate gains among students attending schools facing 
competitive pressure compared with their peers at 
schools within Milwaukee facing relatively little 
pressure and at schools outside of Milwaukee (facing 
no pressure from vouchers).
All three studies find evidence that with the ex-
pansion of the voucher program in 1998, student per-
formance improved in the first few years, especially 
in schools that were most likely to be affected by the 
increased competition. For example, Hoxby (2003) 
estimates that the fourth grade test scores of students 
attending schools likely facing the most competitive 
pressure improved by 0.12σ per year in math and by 
0.07σ per year in reading relative to students attend-
ing comparison schools outside of Milwaukee. 
While interesting, these results must be interpreted 
as being only suggestive. The identifying assumption 
is that there are no unobserved changes before and after 
the voucher program was implemented when compar-
ing the schools with many voucher-eligible students to 
schools with few or no voucher-eligible students. 
However, within the Milwaukee Public School District, 
all schools were potentially affected by the vouchers. 
Further, outside of the Milwaukee Public School  
District, the demographic composition of the schools 
is quite different (specifically, the students are less 
likely to be minority and more likely to come from 
wealthier families) such that it is not clear researchers 
can adequately account for differences between the 
students. In addition, Carnoy et al. (2007) present some 
results that are not consistent with a simple interpre-
tation that performance in the Milwaukee public 
schools improved because of increased competition. 
For example, they also find that there was little im-
provement after 2002 despite the fact that interest  
in the voucher program increased (as proxied by the 
number of applications). Further, they find no evi-
dence of a general equilibrium impact when they em-
ploy other direct measures of competition (such as 
the number of nearby private schools or the relative 
number of voucher applications from a school). 
Evidence from Florida’s A+ Opportunity  
Scholarship Program
In order for a voucher program to spur improve-
ment within the public schools, there need not be a 
substantial number (or proportion) of students who 
use a voucher to attend a private school. Rather, if 
public school administrators perceive there is the po-
tential that the students will do so, they may have an 
incentive to improve the education in their schools. 
Thus, researchers have attempted to gain some in-
sight into the potential response of public schools to 
increased competitive pressure a second way: by study-
ing the schooling outcomes of students attending 
schools that were under the “threat” of becoming voucher- 
eligible—that is, schools with a high probability of 
their students becoming eligible to use a voucher.  
Researchers have done so by taking advantage of the 
design of Florida’s school accountability system— 
its A+ Plan for Education. Specifically, since 1999, 
schools in Florida are given a grade of A through F, 
largely depending on the performance of the students. 
Schools that receive high grades and are improving 
receive bonuses. In contrast, low-performing schools 
(graded either D or F) are subject to increased admin-
istrative oversight. (These poor performers are also 
provided with some additional financial assistance.) 
In addition, if a school received an F in two out of 
four years and had an F in the current year, students 
became eligible for vouchers called Opportunity 
Scholarships.18 While the other features of Florida’s 
A+ Plan for Education remain in effect, the voucher 
program was declared unconstitutional by the Florida 
Supreme Court in January 2006. Thereafter students 11 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
could no longer use a voucher to attend a participat-
ing private school; they are, however, still able to use 
a voucher to attend a higher-graded public school.
Under Florida’s A+ Plan for Education, school 
grades are determined by assigning “grade points” 
based on student test score performance.19 Grades are 
then assigned based on whether the school is above 
or below the predetermined cut points for each of the 
letter grades. Arguably, schools earning just above the 
number of grade points needed to receive an overall 
grade of D are no different than schools receiving just 
below the number of grade points needed to receive  
a D grade. As a result, many of the schools that re-
ceived an F grade are quite similar to many of those 
that received a D grade. Figlio and Rouse (2006), 
West and Peterson (2006), Rouse et al. (2007), and 
Chiang (2008) therefore compare student outcomes 
from schools earning D and F grades while control-
ling for the number of grade points earned so that 
they can recover the causal effect of the policy on  
educational achievement. 
All of the papers find that test scores of students 
improve following a school’s receipt of an F grade. 
For example, Rouse et al. (2007) and Chiang (2008) 
report gains ranging from 0.12σ to 0.14σ in math and 
about 0.10σ in reading. Further, these two studies also 
find evidence that the improvements persist even once 
the students leave the voucher-threatened school, partic-
ularly in math. In addition, Rouse et al. (2007) report 
finding evidence that the F-graded schools responded 
in educationally meaningful ways. For example, fol-
lowing receipt of an F grade, schools were more like-
ly to focus on low-performing students, lengthen the 
amount of time devoted to instruction, and increase 
resources available to teachers. As such, these studies 
may provide some evidence that increased competi-
tive pressure can generate some improvement in pub-
lic schools.20
One should note, however, that the F-graded schools 
in Florida were also stigmatized as “failing” (one of 
the intents of the public announcements of the grades). 
So another possibility is that the stigma of being iden-
tified as a failing school (and perhaps the subsequent 
parental pressure to make changes) led the schools to 
improve. As such, one cannot strictly distinguish a 
“voucher effect” from a “stigma effect.” That said, 
Figlio and Rouse (2006) indirectly assess the impact 
of stigma by comparing student achievement follow-
ing the implementation of Florida’s A+ Plan for  
Education—which enlisted both the threat of vouch-
ers and stigma—with student achievement following 
the placement of schools on a critically low perform-
ers list in 1996, 1997, and 1998 that involved public 
stigma but no threat of vouchers. They estimate that 
the student gains in reading were nearly identical un-
der the two regimes and were actually larger in math 
following placement on the critically low performers 
list, suggesting that the relative improvements among 
the low-performing schools may have been due more 
to stigma than to the threat of vouchers.
There is some evidence from the expansion of 
the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program and from 
the threat of vouchers created by Florida’s A+ Plan 
for Education suggesting that the achievement of stu-
dents attending schools facing increased competition 
improves. However, the research strategies do not al-
low one to definitively rule out other explanations for 
the improvements. As such, we conclude that the jury 
is still out on the potential for vouchers to spur public 
schools to improve.
other potential social gains from vouchers
There may be other reasons why providing school 
vouchers may be appealing from a public policy stand-
point. One might argue in favor of vouchers as a way 
to increase equity by giving poor families more op-
portunities to choose private schools over their neigh-
borhood public schools. Also, based on parents’ reports 
for the publicly funded DC voucher program (DC 
OSP), the schools that are chosen (private schools) 
may be safer. Parents of students offered a voucher 
reported a significantly lower level of perceived school 
danger than parents of students not offered a voucher.21
In a related fashion, student achievement may 
not be the only criterion by which to judge the success 
of voucher programs. If school choice means that par-
ents are more satisfied with the education their children 
are receiving and if voucher programs are no more 
expensive than our current system, then a voucher 
program may be a cost-neutral way to increase social 
welfare. Importantly, one consistent finding in this lit-
erature is that voucher parents report being more sat-
isfied with their current schooling than do nonvoucher 
parents. For example, in the DC OSP, parents of stu-
dents offered a voucher gave their children’s schools 
a significantly higher overall grade on a five-point 
scale (grades A through F) and were significantly more 
likely to give their children’s schools a grade of A or B. 
Further, they reported significantly greater satisfaction 
with their children’s schools on all aspects asked, in-
cluding location, class sizes, discipline, academic 
quality, and the racial mix of the students (Wolf et al., 
2007). These results have generally been reported for 
other voucher programs, such as those in New York 
City (Mayer et al., 2002) and Milwaukee (Witte, 
Sterr, and Thorn, 1995).221 3Q/008, Economic Perspectives
Yet, the potential net improvement in social wel-
fare depends on both the general equilibrium effects 
of vouchers and the cost advantage over current pub-
lic schools—two issues that are not well understood. 
While small-scale voucher programs indicate that 
parents offered a voucher are more satisfied with their 
children’s schools than those not offered a voucher,  
a large-scale voucher program might result in some 
parents who are more satisfied and some who are less 
satisfied. In order for social welfare to be increased 
with a cost-neutral voucher program, the gains to the 
parents who benefit must be large enough to out-
weigh the losses to parents who do not benefit.
In addition, there is not much information about 
whether a well-developed voucher program would, 
indeed, be cost-neutral. On its face an education voucher 
system should be no more expensive than the current 
system as the state (or some other public entity) 
would simply send a voucher check to participating 
schools for each participating child rather than to the 
local public school or district. However, if truly im-
plemented on a large scale, there may be other, less 
obvious costs that would depend critically on the ac-
tual design of the program. Levin and Driver (1997) 
caution that, depending on a number of factors, the 
cost of a voucher system could actually exceed those 
of the current geographically based system. These 
factors include the transportation of children to and 
from school, recordkeeping, and the monitoring of 
student enrollment. Two additional concerns are how 
a program deals with students currently attending pri-
vate schools and how disputes are adjudicated (par-
ticularly if there are differing voucher amounts). 
While Levin and Driver’s estimates are rough, based 
on hypothetical voucher programs and crudely esti-
mated costs, their analysis suggests, at a minimum, 
that we should not assume a voucher program would 
be cost-neutral. Further, there may be large costs as-
sociated with the transition to a voucher system that 
should be considered.
Finally, the studies to date necessarily focus on 
short-run effects of vouchers when in fact there may 
be longer-run impacts on high school graduation,  
college enrollment, or even future earnings. For ex-
ample, Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005a) study the ef-
fect of Catholic education on a variety of outcomes 
and find little evidence that Catholic schools raise 
student test scores. At the same time, their results 
suggest that Catholic schools increase the probability 
of graduating from high school and potentially the 
probability of enrolling in college. These longer-run 
effects have yet to be credibly examined in studies of 
school vouchers.
Conclusion
The best research to date finds relatively small 
achievement gains for students offered education 
vouchers, most of which are not statistically different 
from zero, meaning that those gains may have arisen 
by chance. Further, the very little evidence about the 
potential for public schools to respond to increased 
competitive pressure generated by vouchers also sug-
gests that one should remain wary that large-scale im-
provements would result from a more comprehensive 
voucher system.
So why has it been so difficult for researchers to 
observe large improvements in student achievement 
with school vouchers in the U.S.? One explanation 
may be that schools already compete for students 
through residential choice such that the public sector 
does not operate as poorly as perceived by many.  
Another explanation may be that the education sector 
does not meet the conditions for perfect competition 
(Garner and Hannaway, 1982). For example, infor-
mation on school quality may be costly and difficult 
for parents to obtain, so having more choice may gen-
erate less additional competitive pressure on schools 
than one would expect in a perfect information envi-
ronment. Further, education is not a homogenous 
good. Therefore, while competition for students may 
make schools more responsive to parents, this may  
be achieved through changes in other areas of school 
life, such as religious education or sports, rather than 
academic achievement. 
Despite the heretofore lackluster empirical find-
ings, the theoretical rationale behind school vouchers 
remains compelling: If parents choose schools based 
on academic performance and if we allow them more 
choice, then the schools will need to improve academi-
cally in order to attract students. In addition, others 
have endorsed vouchers to promote greater equity:  
If rich families have the means to opt out of the public 
school system, should not poor families have a simi-
lar opportunity? It is perhaps for these reasons—com-
bined with frustration that other approaches to improve 
the U.S. education system have proven weak or futile—
that school vouchers remain high on the agenda for 
many policymakers.23 However, expectations about 
the ability of vouchers to drastically improve student 
achievement, at least as measured by test scores, 
should be tempered by the results of the studies to 
date, and arguments for vouchers as a cost-neutral  
alternative should be subject to more careful analysis 
of the full costs.13 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
NOTES
1The National Assessment of Educational Progress is the only na-
tionally representative and continuing assessment of what students 
in the U.S. know and can do in various subject areas, such as math-
ematics and reading. The commissioner of education statistics, who 
heads the National Center for Education Statistics in the U.S. 
Department of Education, is responsible by law for carrying out 
the NAEP project; for further details, see http://nces.ed.gov/ 
nationsreportcard/. See also Hoxby (2003).
2The Florida A+ Opportunity Scholarship Program—a publicly funded 
voucher program initially created for students to attend private 
schools—was declared unconstitutional by the Florida Supreme 
Court in January 2006. After this ruling, students could no longer 
use the voucher to attend a participating private school; they are, 
however, still able to use the voucher to attend a higher-rated pub-
lic school. For further details, see the discussion on the Florida A+ 
Opportunity Scholarship Program later in the text and in table 1.
3A less efficient public sector and a less competitive (public school-
ing) environment may explain the larger impacts of school vouch-
ers that have been estimated in other countries, such as Columbia 
(see, for example, Angrist et al., 2002). In the U.S., elementary and 
secondary public schooling has largely depended on local financ-
ing, meaning that choice between local school districts may already 
generate strong competitive pressure. As a result, there may be less 
potential for vouchers to generate large efficiency gains (see, for 
example, Barrow and Rouse, 2004). 
4See, for example, Coleman, Hoffer, and Kilgore (1982a, 1982b); 
Evans and Schwab (1995); Neal (1997); and Altonji, Elder, and 
Taber (2005b). 
5See, for example, Goldberger and Cain (1982), Cain and 
Goldberger (1983), and Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005a).
6Of course, even if vouchers improved outcomes in the long run, 
there might be a transition period in which the full benefits were 
not realized. A more complex version of this hypothetical experi-
ment would be needed to identify both the transitional costs and 
long-run effects of a voucher program.
7Ironically, this also means that this literature bears striking similarity 
to that of the differential effectiveness of private and public schools.
8The range reflects estimates from different model specifications. 
Other studies using these early data from Milwaukee include  
Witte (1997) and Witte, Sterr, and Thorn (1995), as well as Greene, 
Peterson, and Du (1999). Using only the sample of low-income 
students from the Milwaukee Public Schools as a comparison group, 
Witte (1997) and Witte, Sterr, and Thorn (1995) estimate no impact 
of the program on student achievement. Greene, Peterson, and Du 
(1999) only use the unsuccessful applicants as a comparison group 
and estimate a positive impact in both math and reading. See Rouse 
(1998) for further discussion of the differences between the studies.
9The voucher is also progressive in that it pays 90 percent of tuition 
up to $3,450 for those with family income below 200 percent of 
the poverty line and only 75 percent of tuition up to $3,450 for 
those from families earning above 200 percent of the poverty line. 
The original program paid tuition up to a maximum of $2,250 
(Metcalf et al., 1998). The Cleveland Metropolitan School District 
changed its name from the Cleveland Municipal School District  
in 2007.
10The nonrecipient group potentially contains both students who 
did not win the voucher lottery and students not entered into the 
lottery due to the preference given to students from low-income 
families (Metcalf, 2001). 
11The public school sample was generated by using the first grade 
classmates of voucher recipients who did not use their voucher, as 
well as the first grade classmates of program applicants who were 
not awarded a voucher (Metcalf, 2001).
12Although Belfield (2007) only reports results for the third and 
fifth years of the program, he notes that the results are similar for 
the fourth year when the cohort was in third grade.
13Belfield (2007) finds a statistically significant –0.06σ difference 
in math between voucher winners and the public school sample. 
14In addition, Belfield (2007) includes some measures in his empir-
ical specifications that are arguably outcomes of the voucher pro-
gram, namely, class size and teacher’s years of experience. That 
said, his results are largely similar when these controls are excluded. 
15See Wolf et al. (2007) for more details. Students attending low-
performing public schools were given a better chance of winning 
the lottery. Although private school students were eligible for the 
vouchers, they were excluded from the study.
16The U.S. General Accounting Office’s legal name became the 
U.S. Government Accountability Office on July 7, 2004. For fur-
ther details, see www.gao.gov/about/namechange.html.
17In contrast, Howell, Peterson, et al. (2002) estimate a negative 
impact for African American students after three years in the pri-
vately funded voucher program in Washington, DC, although the 
impact is not statistically different from zero. Results for the third 
year of the privately funded programs apply only to those in 
Washington, DC, and New York City because the Dayton, Ohio, 
program was evaluated for only two years. 
18Currently Florida has two other voucher programs as well: an in-
come tax credit for corporations to fund vouchers for low-income 
students and the McKay Scholarship for Students with Disabilities 
Program. Greene and Winters (2008) study the impact of the McKay 
Scholarships on the achievement gains of students with disabilities 
who remain in the public schools. Because their estimation strategy 
identifies the general effect of vouchers by using students whose 
disability status changes, the extent to which these results general-
ize to overall improvements in the public schools is unclear.
19Literally speaking, school grades were not assigned using “grade 
points” before 2002 when Figlio and Rouse (2006) studied the sys-
tem. Nevertheless, their strategy is quite similar in spirit.
20A statistical issue with which all of the researchers wrestle is 
whether the disproportionate gains by students in the F-graded 
schools resulted from mean-reverting measurement error or reflect-
ed actual changes in response to Florida’s A+ Plan for Education. 
Mean-reverting measurement error occurs when gains the year af-
ter a school scores unusually low—and is thereby labeled as F— 
reflect the measurement error in test scores. That is, the test scores 
of students might have increased in many of the F-graded schools 
even in the absence of Florida’s education plan simply because 
they were transitorily low in the prior year. The reliance on a re-
gression discontinuity design (one that compares the D-graded and 1 3Q/008, Economic Perspectives
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